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Intellectual Property and the Economics of Product Differentiation 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
Abstract 
The literature applying the economics of product differentiation to intellectual 
property has been called the most important development in the economic 
analysis of IP in years.  Relaxing the assumption that products are homogeneous 
yields new insights by explaining persistent features of IP markets that the 
traditional approaches cannot, challenging the extent to which IP allows 
rightsholders to earn monopoly profits, allowing for sources of welfare outside of 
price-quantity space, which in turn opens up new dimensions along which 
intellectual property can compete.  It also allows for equilibria with different 
welfare characteristics, making the tendency towards systematic underproduction 
more contingent and suggesting a broader range of policy options for promoting 
optimality.  This Chapter reviews the economics of product differentiation, 
examining both the monopolistic competition and spatial competition lines of this 
scholarship.  It then surveys the literature applying these approaches to patent, 
copyright, and trademark. 
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1. Introduction 
 To date, economic analyses of intellectual property (IP) have been dominated by models 
that frame IP as monopolies and/or public goods.  These approaches have given rise to general 
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policy inferences, such as systematic underproduction, deadweight losses resulting from pricing 
above marginal cost, and the supposedly inevitable tradeoff between access to IP and the 
incentives to create it.  These inferences in turn have led many commentators to call for 
calibrating different aspects of IP protection to mitigate these problems.   
 A new literature is emerging that relaxes the assumption implicit in these models that the 
relevant products are homogeneous and instead proceeds from the premise that all IP faces 
competition from imperfect substitutes.  Allowing for the possibility of product differentiation 
provides new insights into the economics of IP.  It helps explain persistent features of IP markets 
that the traditional approaches cannot.  It challenges the extent to which IP allows rightsholders 
to earn monopoly profits.  It makes the market dynamics more complex by opening up new 
dimensions along which companies can compete.  This in turn allows for possible sources of 
welfare outside of price and quantity and yields equilibria with different welfare characteristics.  
The inevitable tendency towards systematic underproduction is replaced by a more contingent 
world in which either underproduction or overproduction is possible.  It also suggests a broader 
range of policy options for promoting optimality in IP markets.  These insights have led some 
commentators to call this literature “the most important development in the economic analysis of 
copyright in recent years” (Bracha and Syed, 2014, 1842).   
 This Chapter will review the economics of product differentiation and the literature 
applying that literature to IP.  Section 2 introduces the economics of product differentiation.  
Sections 3, 4, and 5 survey the literature applying these approaches to patent, copyright, and 
trademark respectively. 
3 
2. The Economics of Product Differentiation 
 The seminal works in the economies of product differentiation are the monopolistic 
competition theory advanced by Edward Chamberlin (1934) and the spatial competition models 
pioneered by Harold Hotelling (1929).  Each approach emphasizes different aspects of the 
underlying economics.  Monopolistic competition models the market dynamics in the traditional 
price-quantity space of Marshallian economics and takes product differentiation indirectly.  
Conversely, spatial competition portrays differentiation directly and deals with price and quantity 
indirectly. 
2.1. Monopolistic Competition 
 Monopolistic competition retains most of the assumptions underlying perfect 
competition, including free entry and the presence of a substantial number of sellers.1  The key 
difference is that monopolistic competition relaxes the assumption that products are 
homogeneous and serve as perfect substitutes for one another.  When products are differentiated, 
the structure of demand for any particular product allows producers to raise their prices without 
losing all of their demand, because they will be able to retain those customers who place the 
highest value the particular variant that they offer.  Product differentiation thus provides each 
producer with a degree of power over price sufficient to justify modeling each product as facing 
a downward-sloping demand curve.   
 Monopolistic competition theory simplifies the analysis by assuming that consumer 
preferences are symmetric with respect to each product in the group.  The differences across 
different products were abstracted away by product differentiation as consumer demand as 
                                                 
1 Robinson (1933) proposed a related theory of imperfect competition at roughly the same time as 
Chamberlin.  Chamberlin’s approach focused explicitly on product differentiation and provides the more appropriate 
focus for this Chapter. 
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reflecting a generic preference for variety rather than for any particular form of differentiated 
product.  Most importantly for purposes of this chapter, Chamberlin (1934, 57–64) recognized 
regarded patents, copyrighted works, and trademarks as examples of differentiated products to 
which his theory applied.   
 The primary effect of this assumption is to place each product in equal competition with 
all other products in the group rather than in localized competition with a smaller set of near 
neighbors.  Chamberlin’s original formulation also assumed that each producer faced identical 
cost curves.  This allowed him to employ a single graph portraying the price-quantity response of 
a representative firm to model the entire market, although relaxing the symmetry assumptions 
were later shown not to affect the core analysis (Kaldor, 1935; Archibald, 1961).   
 Because monopolistic competition portrays market interactions in a classic price-quantity 
space, it is quite easily integrated into a conventional welfare analysis based on economic 
surplus.  Profit-maximizing producers will produce at the quantity where which their marginal 
revenue and marginal cost curves intersect.  Because monopolistically competitive producers 
face downward-sloping demand curves, in the short run they will set prices in the same manner 
as a monopolist, as depicted in Figure 1.  This results in deadweight loss.  Should price exceed 
average cost, producers may also earn short-run supracompetitive profits. 
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Figure 1:  Short-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition 
 Were entry impossible, this short-run equilibrium would be stable, and the long-run 
outcome would be the same as under the monopoly analysis.  Monopolistic competition, 
however, assumes that entry by close substitutes is always possible.  As a result, the presence of 
supracompetitive profits attracts other producers selling similar products.  Because all of the 
products in the market are in equal competition with one another, new entrants take business 
equally from each of the incumbents, with the demand and supply curves representing the 
decision confronting a representative firm, with the entire industry constituting the sum of all 
such graphs.  Entry causes the demand curve confronting each incumbent to shift inwards, as 
customers substitute purchases of the new product for those of the incumbents.  Although some 
have suggested that the demand curve could either increase or decrease in slope, the increase in 
the number of imperfect substitutes should generally cause demand to become more elastic 
(Varian, 2010).  The resulting long-run equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2:  Long-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition 
 Entry continues until no profits remain.  Under Chamberlin’s original formulation, this 
occurs when the surplus appropriated by each producer is just enough to cover the fixed costs of 
entry, a condition which exists when the demand curve is tangent to the average cost curve.  
There is, however, a well-known exception to Chamberlin’s zero-profit result.  The indivisibility 
of fixed costs may create a situation in which n products would earn small profits while n + 1 
products would run losses.  This so-called “integer problem” allows for an equilibrium in which 
n products each earn sustainable profits (Kaldor, 1935).  So long as the economy is sufficiently 
“large” (i.e., so long as n is relatively sizeable), such profits will be negligible (Eaton and Lipsey, 
1989). 
 As entry causes the demand curve to flatten, deadweight loss shrinks.  Note that whether 
the market will reach long-run equilibrium on a flatter portion of the demand curve depends on 
the assumption that the relevant demand curve is linear.  If the demand function is curved, it 
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could be tangent to the average cost curve at any one of a number of points.  In that case, it is no 
longer inevitable that the market will reach equilibrium at a place where the spread between 
price and marginal cost is narrower.  In addition, the tangency solution also presupposes that the 
producer is charging the same price to all consumers.  Allowing for price discrimination raises 
the possibility that a firm might still earn supracompetitive profits even at the point of tangency, 
meaning that further entry would occur.  
 The equilibrium number of products can be determined by dividing the total surplus 
associated with the entire market by the fixed costs needed for entry.  Indeed, as the size of the 
market expands or the size of the fixed costs declines, the number of products asymptotically 
approaches infinity and the deadweight loss approaches zero.  In this way, as Yoo (2004) pointed 
out, that access to existing products may be promoted indirectly by stimulating entry instead of 
being promoted directly by reducing the scope of the entitlement.  Whether an economy is 
“large” in this manner does not depend upon the size of the fixed costs relative to the size of the 
marginal costs, as suggested by the traditional approach.  Instead, it depends on the magnitude of 
the fixed costs relative to the overall market.  Markets for differentiated products are also biased 
against products whose demands are structured in a way that make it difficult for the producer to 
appropriate surplus (Spence, 1976a, 1976b; Koenker and Perry, 1981; Beath and Katsoulacos, 
1991). 
 Chamberlin regarded the welfare characteristics of the resulting equilibrium as 
demonstrating the systematic inefficiency of markets.  For example, Chamberlin observed that 
monopolistically competitive markets necessarily set prices above marginal cost.  In addition, the 
fact that markets reach equilibrium on the declining portion of the average cost curve implied 
that the monopolistically competitive markets exhibit a sustainable tendency towards excess 
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capacity and that overall costs could be reduced if the total number of sellers were reduced and 
the existing sellers were permitted to increase their production.  He also implied that many forms 
of product differentiation, particularly those associated with trademarks, are spurious and 
represent attempts to increase profits that do not yield any consumer benefits.  The models 
demonstrated the existence of “wastes of competition” that can be as severe as the “wastes of 
monopoly” and required regulatory correction (Chamberlin, 1934, 104–09). 
 Chamberlin’s work prompted a vigorous attack from the Chicago School, who appeared 
to regard its finding of endemic market failure as an attack on perfect competition as the 
benchmark for optimal economic performance (see, e.g., Stigler, 1949; Friedman, 1953; see 
Chamberlin, 1957, for his response).  Subsequent development of the literature on monopolistic 
competition appears to have narrowed the scope of some of these disagreements.  For example, 
Chamberlin’s excess capacity theorem, which is often regarded as the theory’s most significant 
result, is based entirely on measuring welfare on the price-quantity space.  It ignores the fact that 
there may be compensating welfare gains from the product characteristics space (Bishop, 1967; 
Spence, 1976a; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), as Chamberlin (1950, 89) recognized in his later work. 
 A more trenchant criticism offered centers on monopolistic competition’s failure to 
generate testable hypotheses (Archibald, 1961).  As Paul Samuelson (1967) has noted, a theory 
should be measured by the insights that it provides, not for its elegance or for the simplicity of 
the policy inferences it is able to generate.  Commentators have noted the difficulties in 
measuring monopolistic competition empirically (Spence, 1976a).   
2.2. Spatial Competition 
 The fact that monopolistic competition depicts market interactions in the classic price-
quantity space of microeconomics allows for a natural representation of economic welfare 
9 
associated with total surplus.  This approach does not portray product differentiation directly.  
Spatial competition models, in contrast, adopt the opposite tack, making product differentiation 
the primary variable instead of price and quantity.  The original formulations assumed that, 
rather than competing on price, firms instead vie for business by choosing a location along a 
linear geographic space.  Because of transportation costs, customers derive greater utility from 
purchasing from sellers that are closer to their locations.  Utility declines as the distance from the 
store increases until the entire surplus is completely consumed by transportation costs, at which 
point the customer decides not to purchase from that vendor.  Spatial differentiation thus gives 
sellers a degree of power over price, as they can increase price without losing those customers 
who are situated closest (Hotelling, 1929). 
 Economists quickly recognized that the same framework could be used to model 
competition among products distributed along a characteristics space rather than a geographic 
space (Hotelling, 1929; Chamberlin, 1934; Kaldor, 1935; see generally Lancaster, 1977).  Under 
this approach, customers decide whether to purchase a particular product based on how closely 
that product matches their ideal preferences.  The decline in utility represented by transportation 
costs in geographic location models is replaced by divergence from a consumer’s preferred 
characteristics. 
 Examples of two such characteristics spaces are depicted in Figure 3.  The horizontal 
dimension depicts where along the continuum of characteristics a particular product is located.  
The vertical dimension in the graph represents the net surplus available from consumers 
occupying any particular location.  Consumers’ ideal preferences are assumed to be distributed 
uniformly across the characteristics space.  Each product is produced by a different firm, and the 
surplus captured by each product is depicted by a triangle.  The decline in utility resulting from 
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the good’s divergence from the consumer’s ideal preferences is represented by the slope of the 
triangle’s sides.  The slope of this line is determined by the structure of demand, as reflected in 
the relevant cross-price elasticities.  If a product serves as a relatively good substitute for similar 
products, the slope will be relatively flat.  If not, the slope will be relatively steep. 
utility
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Figure 3:  Impact of Fixed Costs on the Equilibrium Under Spatial Competition 
 Consumers are assumed to purchase whichever product lies closest to their ideal 
preferences.  As noted earlier, the symmetric preference assumption posits that all products 
within a group are in equal competition with one another and that entry by a new product takes 
business from all incumbents evenly.  This assumption is represented in spatial models either by 
positing that all products enter simultaneously or by assuming that incumbent products respond 
to product entry by costlessly shifting their position.  The result is an equilibrium in which 
products are evenly distributed across the relevant product space.  To ensure the existence of 
equilibrium, the characteristics space is typically modeled as a unit line or a unit circle.  
Moreover, firms face competition in the areas where two triangles overlap, but will act as 
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monopolists in the areas closer to the peaks of the triangles, which effectively means that they 
will face a kinked demand curve and the accompanying difficulties with defining equilibrium in 
terms of tangency (Salop, 1979).2 
 As was the case under monopolistic competition, entry by additional products divides the 
available surplus into increasingly smaller fragments until the size of those fragments equals the 
fixed costs of entry, at which point no product earns supracompetitive profits, subject again to a 
mild exception for fixed-cost indivisibilities.  Again, the equilibrium number of products can be 
determined by dividing the total surplus by the fixed costs of entry.  If the total surplus is 
significantly greater than the fixed costs of entry, the economy will be relatively “large” and the 
competition among sellers will be relatively substantial.  As the available surplus increases or the 
size of the fixed costs approaches zero, the number of products will approach infinity and all 
customers will purchase products exactly matched to their tastes.  If the total surplus is small 
relative to the fixed costs, the economy will be relatively “small” and products may well enjoy a 
degree of local monopoly or oligopoly power.  Although entry by competitors remains possible 
under these conditions, the volume may be too low to support additional sellers (Eaton and 
Wooders, 1985; Eaton and Lipsey, 1989). 
 Spatial competition provides for a direct representation of product differentiation, 
although the fact that these models do not employ the price-quantity space of neoclassical 
economics means that price competition must be modeled separately and makes it more difficult 
to integrate spatial models into conventional analyses of economic welfare.  In addition, spatial 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, the assumption that prices are constant and endogenously determined can give rise to a 
different equilibrium in which products, rather than being spread evenly across the characteristics space, divide the 
market by entering at the same point (Hotelling, 1929).  The oddities resulting from refusing to allow for price 
competition are well recognized.  For example, the assumption that firms do not compete on price necessarily 
implies that effective competition exists only with respect to consumers located equidistantly from two works.  This 
effect disappears, however, if the model is broadened to allow for endogenous pricing in which price competition is 
possible.   
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competition models are subject to a number of qualifications and refinements.  Not all products 
can be organized into a simple spectrum of characteristics.  Furthermore, while the assumption 
that utility falls linearly with distance is natural when measuring the impact of distance in a 
geographic space, it appears to be less plausible in a characteristics space, where the decay in 
utility could take just about any shape.  As it turns out, the assumption that utility falls linearly is 
a strong one.  For example, the assumption that utility decays quadratically instead of linearly 
leads to radically different results (d’Aspremont et al., 1979). 
 The two different depictions in Figure 3 illustrate how the relative size of the total 
available surplus affects the degree of competition.  The available surplus in the right-hand graph 
is fifty percent larger than that in the left-hand graph.  In both graphs, each individual product 
captures an identical surplus.  As the graphs illustrate, increasing the size of the overall market 
yields a fairly substantial increase in the degree of competition.  More sophisticated models that 
allow for price reactions among competitors further underscore the importance of the relative 
size of the economy.  These models demonstrate that so long as marginal costs are nonzero, 
increases in the size of the economy cause prices to approach marginal cost and reduce profits by 
bringing the revenue captured by each producer more into line with fixed costs. 
 Furthermore, the analysis becomes significantly more complicated when one relaxes the 
rather restrictive assumptions that typify the basic model of spatial competition described above.  
More refined models allow for the possibility of sunk costs in location and sequential entry 
(Baumol, 1967; Hay, 1976; Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Eaton and Lipsey, 1980; Lane, 1980; 
Bonanno, 1987; Neven, 1987; Bhaskar and To, 2004).  Other models relax the assumption that 
prices are fixed and allow prices to be determined endogenously (Salop, 1979; Eaton and 
Wooders, 1985).  Still other models allow for the possibility that a single firm might produce 
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multiple products occupying multiple locations (Schmalensee, 1978; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979; 
Brander and Eaton, 1984; Judd, 1985; Bonanno, 1987).  Still other models allow for the 
possibility that consumers base their purchases on multiple dimensions of characteristics, which 
means that firms compete with more than just two adjacent competitors.  For example, if spatial 
competition takes place on three dimensions, each work may compete with as many as six 
adjacent neighbors.  If competition expands to four dimensions, works may theoretically 
compete with as many as half the works operating in the product group (Archibald and 
Rosenbluth, 1975).  An empirical assessment of the automobile industry concluded that 
differentiated products compete in as many as six dimensions (Feenstra and Levinsohn, 1995).  
Finally, the results change significantly when one allows for the possibility that consumer 
preferences are not distributed equally across the characteristics space (Kaldor, 1935; Eaton and 
Lipsey, 1976).  The basic model is nonetheless sufficient to capture the key intuitions about how 
differentiated products compete and to provide useful insights into markets for differentiated 
products.  As was the case with monopolistic competition, leading commentators on spatial 
competition have noted the difficulty in determining whether any particular equilibrium is 
optimal (Lancaster, 1977; Eaton and Lipsey, 1989) 
2.3. Implications 
 Compared with the traditional approach, the predictions of the differentiated products 
approach to copyright fit better with features of real-world markets for IP.  One of the most 
interesting aspects of the differentiated products approach is that it reconceptualizes the tension 
between access and incentives that motivates much of the economic analysis of IP.  
Chamberlin’s primary point is that the fact that equilibrium prices in markets for differentiated 
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products exceed marginal cost raises questions whether marginal cost pricing represents the 
appropriate benchmark for efficiency. 
 In addition, two complementary insights reveal how product differentiation both creates 
and limits the degree of market power that producers enjoy.  The downward sloping nature of 
demand curves associated with product differentiation also provides an explanation of how 
producers can maintain the power over price to engage in price discrimination in markets that are 
open to free entry and subject to competition (for the seminal work, see Spulber, 1979, 1981; 
Katz, 1984; and Borenstein, 1985; for a recent survey, see Stole, 2008).  At the same time, the 
fact that products serve as imperfect substitutes for one another allows multiple producers to 
coexist and prevent markets from collapsing into natural monopolies even when average costs 
are constantly declining by permitting producers to compete on dimensions other than price 
(Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002).  In so doing, product differentiation appears to provide a more 
realistic description of real-world markets. 
 At the same time, in contrast to perfect competition, in which entry generally promotes 
economic welfare, product differentiation gives rise to the possibility that entry may be excessive 
or insufficient.  Whether a market will tend towards too much or too little entry depends on the 
extent to which the surplus that a new entrant appropriates is the result of demand creation, that 
is incremental sales to new customers who previously were not in the market or incremental 
welfare by permitting purchasers to consume products that provide a better fit with their 
preferences, or demand diversion, that is surplus redistributed from producers already in the 
market.3  The entrant simply compares the total surplus it appropriates to its costs and enters 
                                                 
3 The terminology used in this discussion is taken from Borenstein (1985).  For similar analyses using other 
terminology, see Mankiw and Whinston (1986) (“business stealing effect”) and Beath & Katsoulacos (1991) 
(“cannibalisation”).  For other works recognizing the concept without employing a distinctive moniker, see Spence 
(1976a, 1976b); Koenker and Perry (1981).   
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whenever the former equals or exceeds the latter.  While demand creation represents an 
incremental contribution to welfare, demand diversion does not.  This causes firms to enter even 
when the fixed costs of entry exceed incremental benefits of doing so, in which case, entry is 
excessive.  The greater the proportion of surplus comes from demand diversion, the greater the 
tendency towards excess entry.  Indeed, Salop (1979) estimates that if surplus falls off linearly 
with distance, the equilibrium number of producers will exceed the optimum by a factor of two.  
As Eaton and Lipsey (1989) note, there is thus no invisible hand inexorably pushing markets for 
differentiated products towards optimality.  While demand diversion in homogeneous product 
markets unambiguously produces excess entry, differentiated product markets may create either 
excess or insufficient entry (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). 
 Yoo (2004) points out that the tendency towards excess entry created by demand 
diversion may be offset by the tendency toward insufficient entry created by producers’ inability 
to appropriate the surplus they create. Whether entry levels will exceed or fall short of the 
optimum depends upon which effect dominates.4  The possibility of insufficient entry created by 
incomplete appropriability also opens up the policy space by suggesting that access and 
incentives need not always be in conflict.  If, on the one hand, entry is excessive, any 
strengthening of IP rights will push incentives to create in the wrong direction.  If, on the other 
hand, entry is insufficient, strengthening IP rights can push incentives in the right direction while 
                                                 
4 Although demand diversion allows a new product to capture the same number of buyers as would result 
under complete appropriability, it does not result in the capture of the same buyers.  Instead, demand diversion 
substitutes buyers who already were purchasing other products for new buyers whose purchases represent 
incremental sales.  Thus, although the total number of sales may reach optimal levels, the total surplus generated by 
those sales is likely to fall somewhat short of welfare-maximizing levels because the buyers who actually purchase 
the product are not necessarily those who place the highest value on the good.  Some consumers may purchase 
goods that provide a better fit with their ideal preferences, while others may purchase goods in which the fit is 
worse.  As a result, the equilibrium amounts to a close approximation of a first-best outcome that falls somewhat 
short of maximizing welfare. 
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simultaneously indirectly promoting access by stimulating greater price competition among the 
differentiated products. 
3. Patent 
 During the early 1990s, economists produced a vibrant body of scholarship applying the 
economics of product differentiation to IP.  This literature focused on the tradeoff between patent 
length, measured in the number of years of exclusivity included in the patent grant, and breadth, 
determined by the extent to which patents foreclose others from using similar technologies.  For 
example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) offer a model that measured product differentiation by the 
ability to raise price above marginal cost to find that welfare would be maximized if patents were 
infinitely lived and patent were adjusted to provide the appropriate reward for investment.  This 
is because adjusting patent duration gives rise to the familiar access-incentives tradeoff by both 
increasing the surplus contained within the patent grant and permitting increases in price, 
whereas Gilbert and Shapiro’s measure of breadth implicates only the latter.5  Gallini (1992) 
defines breadth in terms of the size of the cost to invent around a patent to present a model 
finding short-lived, broad patents would be optimal because longer terms hurt patent holders by 
increasing competitors’ incentives to invent around the patent.6  Klemperer (1990) models 
production differentiation directly in a Hotelling-style model, characterizing patent scope as the 
size of the characteristics space over which the patent gives the patentee exclusivity rights.  He 
concludes that if consumer preferences are homogeneous across all products, infinitely lived, 
narrow patents would maximize welfare.  If consumers have strong preferences for particular 
product characteristics, short, broad patents would improve welfare. 
                                                 
5 Tandon (1982) proposed a similar model favoring infinitely lived patents limited by a compulsory license. 
6 Denicolò (1996) presents a model yielding a similar result. 
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 This literature recognizes the existence of additional policy instruments that would 
calibrate the strength of the patent grant.  Gilbert and Shapiro define breath in a way that 
effectively focuses on appropriability of surplus.  Klemperer demonstrates the ambiguous impact 
of demand diversion by showing how a high level of substitution among goods favors granting a 
narrow patent.7  The result is a policy space that is richer and more nuanced than the previous 
literature which focused exclusively on calibrating patent duration (Nordhaus, 1969; Scherer 
1972).   
 Later scholars extended this literature in important ways.  Matutes, Regibeau, and 
Rockett (1996) look at the proper patent regime for basic innovations that benefit multiple 
markets.  In order to minimize the period during which the inventor postpones disclosing its 
invention in order to have more time to develop the expertise to commercialize these multiple 
markets, Matutes et al. prefer a patent that is short in duration, but broad in scope.  O’Donoghue, 
Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998) apply a conventional spatial competition model with substitutes 
from alternative technologies distributed along a quality scale to distinguish between lagging 
breadth, which is breadth that forecloses low-cost imitations, and leading breadth, which 
forecloses higher-quality innovations.  They found patents that protected lagging breadth 
provided sufficient incentives for R&D.  With respect to leading breadth, a long, narrow patent 
was superior in reducing R&D costs, while a short, broad patent would reduce market 
distortions.  The authors conclude that a long, narrow patent is preferable when the hit rate of 
new innovations is high.  Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) focus on independent invention, arguing 
for narrow breadth protection because the threat of independent invention would encourage 
                                                 
7 See also Waterson (1990) using a similar spatial competition model to show how demand diversion can 
lead to excess entry. 
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licensing of the patent and discourage duplicative investments in R&D.8  Beschorner (2008) 
frames his analysis as a tradeoff among patent length, breadth, and what he terms height, which 
is the degree of novelty required to justify receiving a patent, to conclude that a finite patent 
length would maximize welfare and that a monopolist would require a lower level of novelty 
than would be socially optimal.  Further explorations of the other aspects of product 
differentiation theory are likely to follow. 
4. Copyright 
 An equally dynamic body of scholarship has emerged applying product differentiation 
theory to copyright, this time conducted primarily by legal academics.  The initial analyses used 
product differentiation to analyze competition between a work and inferior quality copies of the 
same work (Johnson, 1985; Liebowitz, 1986; Besen & Kirby, 1989), analyze competition 
between creative and noncreative works (Lunney, 1996), or to briefly mention the impact of 
demand diversion (Meurer, 2001).   
4.1 Differentiated Products Competition Between Different Works 
 More complete analyses of competition between different copyrighted works began with 
Yoo (2004), who offered the most complete exploration of the dynamics and welfare 
characteristics of both the monopolistic competition and spatial competition approaches to 
product differentiation that has yet appeared in the literature.  Importantly, it applies the 
traditional length versus breadth tradeoff to copyright, while adding a third dimension termed 
intensity, which refers to the proportion of the available surplus that copyright holders can 
appropriate through price discrimination and other similar mechanisms.  He also notes that the 
size of the market relative to fixed cost determines the number of works in equilibrium.  As the 
                                                 
8 See Lemley and McKenna (2012) for a related argument appearing in the legal literature.  
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size of the market increases and the size of fixed costs decreases, pricing converges to the 
perfectly competitive outcome, although the problems of excess entry become worse, which 
opens the possibility of promoting access by increasing the number of surplus-generating 
activities contained within the copyright and facilitating copyright holders’ ability to engage in 
price discrimination and relying on the ensuing price competition to reduce prices, although 
doing so could exacerbate problems of excess entry.  He then analyzes the implications for 
copyright doctrines such as fair use, the first-sale doctrine, digital rights management, and 
derivative works.  
 Abramowicz (2004) employs spatial competition model to analyze the impact of demand 
diversion on optimal entry.  Although he recognizes that whether a market will reach equilibrium 
with too much or too little entry, he relies on the findings of the circle model put forth by Salop 
(1979) and a simulation to suggest that excess entry is the more likely outcome.  He 
acknowledges that Salop’s result depends on the assumption that the welfare that individual 
consumers derive from consuming a particular work falls off linearly with distance in the 
characteristics space.  He also addresses a wide range of other economic issues, including wealth 
distribution, winner-take-al markets, positional goods, and externalities, and noneconomic issues, 
such as democracy.  Faulhaber (2006) similarly applies the Salop model along with sunk costs in 
location to provide a model finding excess entry in music.  Lemley and McKenna (2012) are 
similarly concerned about excess entry, arguing for narrowing breadth by increasing the degree 
of similarity required to find infringement and narrowing leading breadth by construing fair use 
and derivative works doctrine to provide greater latitude to works that provide incremental 
contributions. 
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 The divergent emphases of these two lines of research underscore the ambiguity of the 
welfare characteristics of differentiated product models, which both authors recognize.  Bracha 
and Syed (2014) acknowledge the contribution of the Yoo and Abramowicz papers, but criticize 
both for drawing overly simple policy inferences.  While both papers emphasize different sides 
of the divergent possible results, both acknowledge the inherent ambiguity of the differentiated 
products equilibria.9   
 The welfare ambiguity of product differentiation underscores the importance of the small 
empirical literature exploring the economic performance of markets for creative works.  Like the 
theoretical literature, the empirical literature is divided.  On the one hand, Goettler and Shachar 
(2001) empirically assess the spatial competition among the three major U.S. television 
networks, concluding that the networks’ program offerings nearly fully achieved the optimum 
suggested by the underlying Nash equilibrium and that the shortfall was largely (but not 
completely) explained by the networks’ adherence to the rules of thumb against airing sitcoms 
after 10:00 p.m. and against airing news magazines before 10:00 p.m.  On the other hand, Berry 
and Waldfogel (1999) empirically study entry patterns in the radio industry, finding that the 
deadweight losses attributable to excess entry may be substantial.  They acknowledge that their 
study focuses exclusively on advertisers and therefore ignores potential benefits users and that 
their assumption that the radio market is composed of homogeneous products causes them to 
ignore potential welfare benefits resulting from product differentiation. 
                                                 
9 Bracha and Syed (2014) also place great weight on the distinction between the impact of product 
differentiation on supramarginal vs. inframarginal works.  All of this is taken into account by the symmetry 
assumption, and the literature has long recognized that relaxing this assumption leads to inferences that are more 
ambiguous that Bracha and Syed suggest. 
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4.2 Spatial Competition and Impure Public Goods 
 A small literature also exists connecting the economics of product differentiation with the 
theory of impure public goods.  The conventional wisdom is that IP is a pure public good and 
that as such exhibits a systematic tendency towards underproduction.  Although most attribute 
that to the pricing problems inherent in zero marginal, a review of seminal works on public 
goods indicates that the problem is one of incentive compatibility inherent in the Samuelson 
condition, stemming from the inability to get consumers to reveal their marginal preference for 
public goods. 
 The literature on impure public goods associated with club goods (Buchanan, 1965) or 
local public goods (Tiebout, 1956) adds a congestion function to the standard public goods set 
up.  The resulting equilibria tradeoff the incurrence of additional fixed costs against the reduction 
in congestion costs associated with creating an additional impure public good.  Unlike the 
Samuelson condition, congestion is potentially incentive compatible.  Numerous Nobel laureates 
have identified the connection between spatial competition and impure public goods, with the 
congestion function being replaced with the transportation costs function in the product 
characteristics space (Samuelson, 1958; Buchanan, 1965; Stiglitz, 1977).   
 Yoo (2007) applies the insights of impure public goods theory to copyright.  As is the 
case with product differentiation, simple policy inferences disappear for impure public goods, 
including the systematic tendency towards underproduction.  It similarly opens up the possibility 
of alternative policy approaches, such as promoting access by increasing the size of the market 
and stimulating entry that induces greater price competition.  Because the shape of the 
congestion function can take any form, there is no necessary reason to believe that the 
equilibrium induced by the congestion function will prove optimal.  Like markets for 
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differentiated products, markets for impure public goods can produce too many works or too 
few.10   
5. Trademark 
 Of all of the forms of IP, Chamberlin (1934) devoted the most attention to trademarks, 
presenting an extended discussion of them in Appendix E of his book.  He regarded the 
differentiation associated with trademarks as motivated primarily to promote monopoly and 
argued that lowering the standard for infringement would bring markets closer to the competitive 
ideal.  He particularly questioned the need for extending trademark protection to descriptive 
words, color, shape, design, packaging and labels, when an “inconspicuous identification mark 
or the name and address of the producer” would suffice.  Anything more simply conveys 
monopoly power to the mark holder.  Chamberlin acknowledged that free imitation of 
trademarks would harm consumers by eliminating incentives to maintain product quality, but 
thought that an alternative regime centered on “defining quality standards by law” “has large 
possibilities” and “would be equally effective.”  He also acknowledged that trademarks can 
stimulate variety and give consumers wider choice, but such variety came at the cost of higher 
prices.  Although Chamberlin conceded that theory provides no basis for how best to strike this 
tradeoff, on balance he nonetheless came down squarely against trademarks, arguing that 
weakening trademark protection would discourage “[u]seless innovation,” would reduce the 
“wastes of advertising,” and would focus producers less on creating monopoly and more on 
production, which in turn would create “[f]ewer ‘business’ men and more laborers.”  Innovations 
would still be protected by patent law and by first-mover advantages.  If this were insufficient, 
                                                 
10 For a related analysis, see Barnes (2011) arguing that impure public goods theory does not support 
strengthening copyright protection. 
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trademark protection should be only of limited duration, say five years (Chamberlin, 1934, app. 
E).   
 Chamberlin launched a tradition of scholars largely critical of trademarks as a source of 
spurious differentiation (see, e.g., Brown, 1948; Scherer, 1970, 1976; Comanor and Wilson, 
1979; Schmalensee, 1979).  Contemporary antitrust scholars raised similar concerns (Bain, 
1956).  These concerns reached their zenith in the late 1970s, exemplified by the FTC’s case 
against Borden’s ReaLemon lemon juice (for an overview, see Mensch and Freeman, 1990; 
McClure, 1996).  The initial 1974 complaint and 1976 decision by the administrative law judge 
alleged that Borden’s trademark promotion and advertising had created an entry barrier and 
required Borden to license its ReaLemon trademark to anyone wishing to compete with it.  When 
the full Commission reviewed this decision, it similarly concluded that ReaLemon represented a 
classic case study of spurious and artificial product differentiation created by advertising and not 
by the superiority of its product or its greater efficiency.  The Commission declined to impose 
compulsory licensing of the trademark, concluding that the remedy of preventing Borden from 
engaging in selective price reductions was sufficient.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit upheld this decision over a strong dissent from Judge Cornelia Kennedy.  The advent of 
the Reagan Administration led the FTC to reverse itself and support Borden’s request to vacate 
and remand the Sixth Circuit’s decision.  The Commission’s revised 1983 order repudiated the 
reasoning of its initial 1978 order, concluding instead that trademark-driven product 
differentiation can promote competition, particularly by reducing search costs.   
 Combined with the FTC’s abandonment of its Cereals case in 1981, which included 
similar claims of artificial product differentiation through advertising, and the Maxwell House 
case in 1984, the ReaLemon case is widely regarded as signaling the downfall of the 
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Chamberlinian critique of trademarks as a form of spurious product differentiation (Mensch and 
Freeman, 1990; McClure, 1996; Weinberg, 2005).  Since that time, the economics of trademark 
has generally come to regard trademarks as a way to reduce search costs and to promote 
investment (for the leading statement, see Landes and Posner, 1987).  Some scholars have 
continued to advocate a Chamberlinian approach (Lunney, 1999).  Others have taken a more 
balanced approach, acknowledging that trademarks can represent a positive source of product 
differentiation and information for consumers, but looking for ways to limit the potential abuses 
of power (Barnes, 2009; Lemley and McKenna, 2014). 
6. Conclusion 
 Product differentiation has represented a generative force in the economic analysis of IP.  
Not only does it offer a better theoretical explanation for a number of market features, it also 
provides a basis for formalizing both the access and incentives sides of the tradeoff in a way that 
yields insights into their structural interrelationship.  Product differentiation also creates the 
possibility of excess entry.  It also demonstrates the existence of circumstances under which 
strengthening IP protection can promote both access and incentives simultaneously.  This stands 
in stark contrast to the position that dominates existing scholarship, which views these two 
considerations as being in inexorable tension. 
 It may seem counterintuitive that protection should be the greatest when high fixed costs 
and low substitutability cause the market to become the most concentrated, but this apparent 
paradox is resolved once one understands the complex manner in which access and incentives 
interact with one another.  In this sense, the differentiated products approach captures some of 
the insights of classic property theory, which emphasizes the importance of well-defined 
property rights in ensuring optimal investment and deployment.  In so doing, it corrects for the 
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blind spot that results when markets for IP are treated as monopolies and allows for serious 
consideration of the role of short-run profits in stimulating entry and promoting economic 
efficiency.  At the same time, it moves beyond classic property theory by identifying ways in 
which a property right can be too strong. 
 It bears noting that the differentiated products approach cannot completely resolve the 
tension between access and incentives.  The presence of a downward-sloping demand curve 
renders some degree of deadweight loss endemic.  In addition, the fact that perfect price 
discrimination is impossible prevents rightsholders from appropriating the entire surplus created 
by their IP.  As a result, markets may exhibit a systematic tendency towards having too few 
products.  However, demand diversion makes it possible that the market will produce the optimal 
number of products.  Any such solution to the incentives side of the tradeoff necessarily requires 
accepting a degree of inefficiency in terms of access.  As the theory of the comparative second-
best aptly points out, the differentiated products approach’s inability to generate first-best 
outcomes is not by itself sufficient to justify rejecting it.   
 In addition, the differentiated products approach allows for a more nuanced analysis by 
making it possible for policymakers to distinguish among different aspects of IP protection.  This 
represents a substantial improvement over the traditional approach, which tends to represent all 
aspects of the strength of IP with a single variable and fails to distinguish among different 
aspects of protection.  In so doing, it identifies circumstances under which efficiency might best 
be served by making the right large (in terms of surplus-generating activities within its scope) 
and intense (in terms of the proportion of that surplus that producers are able to appropriate), but 
narrow (in terms of how close another product can come to an existing product without 
infringing the IP).  Thus, the differentiated products approach does not amount to a blanket 
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endorsement for strengthening IP protection.  On the contrary, the resulting theory allows for a 
degree of subtlety that is impossible under other approaches. 
 Although the application of product differentiation to IP has yielded some interesting 
insights, considerable additional work remains to be done before it can be fully operationalized.  
As noted earlier, further work should incorporate elements of cumulative innovation that take 
into account the extent to which existing IP serves as inputs to subsequent products.  
Furthermore, the differentiated products approach should be broadened to account for 
endogenous pricing as well as the preemptive strategies available when entry is sequential and 
when firms can occupy more than one location.   
 The models also should consider the implications of relaxing the symmetrical preferences 
assumption, either by allowing for variations in the distribution of consumers across the 
characteristics space or by allowing the extent to which particular products serve as substitutes 
for other products to vary.  Relaxing the symmetry assumption allows for the possibility that the 
impact of entry by a new product will no longer be spread evenly across all of the incumbents.  
Instead, it suggests that the entry will affect only some of the products.  This localization of 
competition has the effect of dividing the relevant market into subsegments, with the overall 
competitiveness of each subsegment determined by the size of the total surplus of the 
subsegment relative to the fixed cost.  The lack of robust competition within a subsegment may 
limit the extent to which entry can push price towards marginal cost.  It can also allow the 
“integer problem” to arise simultaneously with respect to multiple portions of the overall market, 
as the single “large economy” is chopped into a series of “small economies” that each are 
capable of supporting sustainable profits.11  If these effects arise with respect to multiple 
                                                 
11 Interestingly, the market need not be divided into discrete subsegments in order for this effect to occur.  
Variations in the density of firms across the product space can balkanize the industry into a chain of “overlapping 
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subsegments, the combined adverse impact may be quite substantial, although the resulting 
policy prescription may be the same as when consumer preferences are assumed to be 
symmetric. 
 Countervailing considerations exist as well.  The discussion of spatial competition 
assumes that product characteristics vary along a single dimension, in which case products 
compete exclusively with their two adjacent neighbors.  The localized nature of differentiated 
products competition can be substantially mitigated if spatial competition occurs along more than 
one dimension. 
 The inherent ambiguity of the outcomes under product differentiation suggests that the 
early fight between Chamberlin and the Chicago School may have been somewhat overstated.  It 
also underscores that the study of product differentiation would benefit from more empirical 
work.  Moreover, the policy instruments that follow from the differentiated products approach 
are by their nature extremely contextual and do not lend themselves to simple inferences.  In 
addition, the interrelationships among the available policy instruments make calibrating them 
simultaneously an extremely difficult empirical exercise.  The fact that the differentiated 
products approach is contextual and nuanced should not obscure its basic analytical power.  
Indeed, the intuitions that the theory reveals about the relationship between access and 
efficiency, the manner in which the various aspects of IP protection interrelate, and the true 
relationship between IP and public goods theory are sufficient to justify further inquiry. 
                                                                                                                                                             
oligopolies,” each comprised of a small number of firms engaged in localized competition regardless of how many 
firms are operating in the overall market.  This can give rise to the same problems even in the absence of actual gaps 
in the product continuum (Kaldor, 1934; Eaton & Lipsey, 1989). 
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